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MARcH-APRIL, 1962
ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR.*
During 19611 the Colorado Supreme Court decided over fifty
cases dealing with criminal law and procedure, includink cases
concerned with violations of municipal ordinances.2 In addition, the
1961 Colorado legislature enacted a dozen statutes on criminal
matters.3
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. Municipal Power to Enact Penal Ordinances
Pre-1961 Colorado cases had held that, in the absence of legis-
lation enlarging municipal power to enact penal ordinances, (1) a
home-rule city has no power to enact a penal ordinance dealing
with a matter of statewide concern which is already covered by
a counterpart state statute;4 and (2) a "statutory" municipality
(i.e., one without home rule), besides being subject to the above
limitation applicable to home-rule cities, also lacks the power to
enact an ordinance even on a matter of local concern, if there is a
state statute on the matter so complete that the state may be said
to have pre-empted the field. 5 A 1961 case re-enforced this last
straight-jacket proposition, holding that a statutory city has no
power to punish reckless driving6-a matter which was earlier held
to be of local concern.
7
In 1961 the process continued, at a reduced rate, of pigeon-holing
various types of forbidden conduct into the statewide category and
the local category. Thus vagrancy was held to be a matter of local
concern.' But two important events occurred during the year to
diminish the importance of these pigeon holes. First, a Colorado
case, Woolverton v. Denver,9 recognized that conduct is not neces-
sarily purely local or exclusively statewide; that some types of
conduct have both statewide and local implications; and that with
such types the home-rule city has power if the state does not forbid
it. Second, the 1961 Colorado legislature, in response to a 1959 invi-
*Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Low.
I The cases discussed in this article are found in 358 P.2d No. 2 through 367 P.2d, except for
Gallegos v. People, 358 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960), discussed in the review of 1960 cases, 38 DICTA 65
(1961).
2 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958), as explained by Geer v. Alaniz,
138 Colo. 177, 331 P.2d 260 (1958), holds that a municipal penal ordinance of a home-rule city
creates a crime, not a civil wrong, if either (a) there exists a counterpart state statute punishing
the same conduct or (b) the ordinance authorizes imprisonment as punishment. The penal ordinance
of a "statutory" municipality (i.e., one without home rule) doubtless is also a crime if there is a
counterpart state statute or the ordinance authorizes imprisonment.
3 In this article the author departs from his practice of prior years by including herein the 1961
legislative developments in the field of criminal law and procedure.
4 Canon City v. Merris, supra note 2.
5 Aurora v. Mitchell, 144 Colo. 526, 357 P.2d 923 (1960), discussed by the author of this article
in 38 DICTA 6
5
,at 66 (1961).
6 Vanatto v. Steamboat Springs, 361 P.2d 441 (Colo. 1961).
7 Retallick v. Colorado Springs, 142 Colo. 214, 351 P.2d 884 (1960) (since the matter is local,
a home-rule city has power to enact an ordinance punishing reckless and careless driving).
8 Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961) (a home-rule city has power to punish
vagrancy).
9 361 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1961) (a home-rule city has power to punish gambling).
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tation by the Colorado Supreme Court, 0 passed a statute authoriz-
ing municipalities (statutory as well as home-rule) to enact penal
ordinances punishing most traffic offenses committed within their
municipal borders."
As to the first of these events, the Colorado Supreme Court in
Woolverton v. Denver held that gambling (an offense punishable
by a Denver ordinance with a maximum punishment of ninety days
in jail and $300 fine, and punishable more lightly by a state statute
with a maximum punishment of $150 fine) is a matter of local as
well as statewide concern; and, since the state legislature has not
forbidden municipalities to deal with gambling (and in fact has
affirmatively consented" to their doing so), the city has power to
punish the offense of gambling.'3 The Woolverton case involved
gambling in a home-rule city; but its rule probably would apply
also to gambling in a statutory city or town because the state legis-
lature has affirmatively invited both types of municipalities to
regulate gambling. Woolverton is not altogether clear, for purposes
of home-rule city regulation of matters in the partly-local-partly-
statewide category, whether it is enough that the legislature has
not forbidden municipal regulation, or whether an affirmative
legislative consent to regulation is also required.
The second event-the 1961 statute14 expressly authorizing both
home-rule cities and statutory municipalities 5 to enact penal
ordinances punishing many traffic offenses which are also punish-
able by state statutes-is a continuation of the trend, disclosed in
Woolverton, toward recognition of concurrent power of state and
municipalities over minor offenses committed within municipal
boundaries. Three traffic offenses are expressly excepted by the
statute from the exercise of municipal power and left solely in the
hands of the state. These are driving under the influence, driving
an unregistered car or after license revocation or suspension, and
hit-and-run driving. Other traffic matters may be regulated by
municipalities. An ordinance punishing a traffic offense need not
be worded exactly like the statute and need not provide exactly
the same punishment. 16 The statute further contains provision for-
bidding state prosecution of a traffic violation after a municipal
court conviction of the offense on a guilty or not-guilty plea. Doubt-
less, though the statute does not say so, the converse is true that
10 Davis v. Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d 674 (1959), invited the Colorado legislature to enact
legislation delegating to home-rule cities concurrent power to enact penal ordinances dealing with
matters which are of both statewide and local concern.
11 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, 7 (1953).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 139-32-1 (52) (1953), empowering home-rule and statutory cities and towns
"to suppress gaming and gambling houses."
13 Woolverton v. Denver, supra note 9. The opinion of Doyle, J., concurred in by Day, Sutton
and McWilliams, JJ., spoke in terms of black and white (matters exclusively local or exclusively
statewide) and gray (partaking of both local and statewide qualities), with gambling falling in
the gray area. The ather three justices rejected the gray category in favor of pure black and pure
white; but Moore, J., concurring, thought that gambling is b ack (purely local) whereas Hall, C.J.,
and Frantz, J., dissented on the ground that gambling is white (exclusively statewide).
14 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 66, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-4-6, 7 (1953).
15 The 1961 statute authorizes the adoption of traffic regulations by "all local municipal author-
ities." i.e., by both home-rule and statutory cities and towns.
16 Thus the 1961 statute amends Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-6 (1953) by deleting the narrow former
language permitting municipalities to adopt traific regulations "not in conflict" with state traffic
statutes and by substituting broader language allowing them to adopt traffic regulations "which
cover the same subject matter" as the state traffic statutes.
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a state conviction bars municipal prosecution for the same traffic
offense.'7
Assume that, in spite of the above-described expansions of
municipal power, a municipality nevertheless lacks the power to
enact a penal ordinance punishing certain conduct, but that, in
spite of this lack, the municipality, having enacted a void ordinance,
charges a defendant with violating the ordinance and convicts him
thereof and collects a fine. Can the defendant, on learning of the
mistake, thereafter recover the fine he paid under a mistake of
law? A 1961 case holds that he cannot.18
B. Particular Crimes
1. Murder - Premeditation and Deliberation. - If the defendant
without justification or excuse intentionally kills his victim, he is
guilty of murder; but first degree murder under the Colorado
statute 9 requires not just an intent to kill ("willfulness"), but pre-
meditation and deliberation besides. It is difficult to ascribe any
exact meaning to these vague words.20 Perhaps it may be said that
premeditation involves asking oneself the question, "Shall I kill
him?"; willfulness involves the answer, "Yes, I shall"; and deliber-
ation involves the further thought: "But if I do, what are the
consequences? Well, I'll do it anyway." It is often said that each of
these three separate thoughts requires very little time. A 1961 case
upheld the trial court's instruction, objected to by the defendant,
to the effect that the three thoughts require only enough time "for
one thought to follow another."'21 Another case held that premedita-
tion, as well as the intent to kill, may be inferred from the defend-
17 The Woolveron case itself, 361 P.2d 982, 990, recognizes, in a dictum, that the municipality,
being a creature of the state, is not, for double jeopardy purposes, a separate sovereign from its
creator the state. See also Kneier, Prosecution Under Stote Low And Municipal Ordinance As Double
Jeopardy, 16 Cornell L.Q. 201 (1931), and Scott, Municipal Penal Ordinances in Colorado, 30 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 267, 281, 283 (1958).
18 Prilliman v. Canon City, 360 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1961) (defendant, convicted and fined in
municipal court for drunken driving before the Merris case held that there is no municipal power
over drunk driving, cannot recover back the amount of his fine, for there can be no restitution
for money voluntarily paid under mistake of law concerning the constitutionality of an ordinance).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953). "[Wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing" is first-degree
murder.
20 Cardozo, Law and Literature and Other Essays, 96-101 (1931).
21 Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961). Frantz, J., dissented on the ground that the
instruction requiring only enough time "for one thought to follow another" was improper in the
setting of this case because the evidence had shown that the defendant was particularly slow-
witted. On principle, of course, the jury should be instructed in the case of a mentally-retarded
defendant not only that the defendant needs a little time to premeditate and deliberate, but also
that he should have capacity to do so. Cf. Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463 (1945) (especially
dissent by Frankfurter, J.), discussed at 34 Calif. L. Rev. 625 (1946), 46 Colum. L. Rev. 1005 (1946),
99 U. Pa. L. Rev. 267 (1950), 56 Yale L.J. 959 (1947).
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ant's intentional use of a deadly weapon, in a deadly way, upon
the body of his victim. 22 It would seem, however, that, although an
intent to kill may be properly inferred from such conduct, the fact
that this intent was premeditated and deliberate ought to require
something further in the way of evidence concerning the circum-
stances surrounding the delivery of the lethal blow.
23
2. Robbery. - A 1961 case stated that robbery, defined by Colo-
rado statute as "the felonious and violent taking of money, goods
or other valuable thing from the person of another by force or
intimidation,"24 is not a crime requiring a specific intent, so that
defendant's proffered evidence of his mental incapacity to form a
specific intent to rob is irrelevant. 25 But the word "felonious" in the
definition of robbery requires a specific intent, the same specific
intent to steal (to deprive the owner of his property) which larceny
requires. Robbery is nothing more than larceny-plus, i.e., with all
the elements of larceny, plus (a) a taking from the person or pres-
ence of the victim, (b) done by force or intimidation.26 Of course,
one must be pretty far gone mentally to be placed in the category
in which, even though he is not insane, he lacks the capacity to
intend to steal, when, as in the case under discussion, he enters a
hotel lobby with a hammer hidden in his coat, hits the desk clerk
several lethal blows with the hammer and a pipe wrench, and then
thoughtfully empties the cash register, cash drawer and change
bowl before leaving the premises with his pockets full of money.
3. Forgery. - A borrower, in order to induce a bank to make
him a loan, wrote out and signed four invoices which stated that
he had sold goods to and performed services for X, for which X
owed him $2,000. In fact, he had never delivered such goods or
performed such services for X, who was a non-existent person. The
borrower assigned the false invoices to the bank with intent to
defraud. On the strength of these invoices, the bank lent him money,
which he never repaid. The bank had an insurance policy insuring
it against losses caused by accepting documents with the "forged"
signature of a maker, drawer, endorser or assignor. The Colorado
Supreme Court properly held that the bank's loss was not covered
by the forgery insurance, for, whatever his crimes, the borrower
did not commit forgery.27 The borrower wrote out and signed a
genuine writing containing lies and by obtaining the bank's money
he was no doubt guilty of false pretenses, but he was not guilty of
forgery. Thus it is sometimes said that "a forgery tells not merely
a lie but a lie about itself."
22 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961).
23 Thus in People v. Biornsen, 79 Cal.App.2d 519, 180 P.2d 443 (1947), there was evidence that
the defendant had "thoughtfully taken the precaution" of taking several cartridges with him before
shooting the victim twice with a single-barreled shotgun. The court said, "We think these circum.
stances sufficiently supply the necessary proof of premeditation, deliberation and malice" to support
a conviction for first-degree murdcr.
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-1 (1953).
2 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 243 (1962),
reversing the conviction of robbery on other grounds, however. Dayle, J., concurring, properly
points out that nothing is clearer than that robbery is a specific-intent crime.
26 Perkins, Criminal Low, 236-37 (1957): "The word 'felonious' [in the usual definition of
robbery] means a taking with intent to steal;" and "robbery is larceny plus certain circumstances
of aggravation."
27 United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 364 P.2d 202 (Colo. 1961), following the
famous Colorado case, DeRose v. People, 64 Colo. 332, 171 Pac. 359, 1918C L.R.A. 1193 (1918) (an
employee who writes out and signs a time sheet showing he has worked 40 hours when he in
fact has worked but 30, is not guilty of forgery even though he intends to defraud his employer).
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4. Possession of Narcotics. - In Colorado, as in other jurisdic-
tions, it is a crime to "possess" narcotics. 2 The statute does not say
"knowingly possess." In civil law, as first year students of the law
of personal property know, there may be such a thing as unconscious
possession, i.e., possession of an article of whose existence or of
whose nature the possessor is unaware, if he is in possession of
the place wherein the article lies.2 9 But in criminal law unconscious
possession ought not to do, and the Colorado courts properly require
that, for the crime of narcotics possession, the defendant must both
(a) know of the presence of the forbidden article and (b) know
that the article is a narcotic drug.
30
5. Larceny by Bailee. - An accountant and tax consultant ad-
vised a taxpayer, after making out his return, that he owed $1250
federal income taxes. The taxpayer gave the accountant his check
for $1250, payable to the accountant, with which to pay the taxes
to the federal government. The accountant, however, filed a return
showing that the taxpayer had overpaid his tax. Then the accountant
deposited the check in his checking account and withdrew $1200
for his private purposes. In most other states a bailee or agent who
is handed money by his bailor or principal to deal with according to
the bailment or agency agreement is guilty of embezzlement if he
fraudulently converts the money to his own use, but in Colorado
he is guilty of the crime of "larceny by bailee, ' ' 31 a crime which
is considered neither embezzlement nor larceny.
6. Constitutional Issues. - One 1961 case involved the constitu-
tionality of the Colorado sex offenders act,32 upholding the one-day-
to-life sentence feature of the act against the contention that, by
providing different penalties depending upon whether the trial
court decides to use the act or not, the act denies the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and against the contention that the act confers
judicial power on the parole board (charged with the task of
determining when to release the offender from the institution).
33
Another case, after construing Denver's vagrancy ordinance, upheld
the constitutionality of that hard-to-define offense.34 Still another
case upset a conviction for driving after license suspension because
28 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-6-2, 20 (1953).
29 Brown, Personal Property 22 (2d ed. 1955).
30 Mickens v. People, 365 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1961) (such a definition held to be "a fair exposition
of the low's contemplation of 'possession' and eminently fair to the defendant"); Duran v. People,
360 P.2d 132 (Cole. 1961). A leading case is State v. Cox, 91 Ore. 518, 179 Pac. 575 (1919) (hotel
porter carrying suitcase containing liquor not guilty of possessing liquor in absence of knowledge
of contents of baggage).
Model Penal Code, § 2.01(4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), even more accurately provides that
possession of contraband can give rise to criminal liability only if the possessor knowingly procured
or knowingly received the forbidden article or was aware of his control of it for so long a time
that he could have gotten rid of it.
31 Fing v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961) (evidence, set forth in the text, supports conviction
of larceny by bailee).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-19-1 to 39-19-9 (1953), permits the. trial judge, in his discretion, to
sentence anyone convicted of certain sex crimes (including indecent liberties) to a state instiution
for a one-day-to-life term, instead of sentencing him according to the provisions of the statute
defining and punishing the crime. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2.32 provides for a ten year maximum
term for the crime of taking indecent liberties with a child.
33 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961) (one-day-to-life sentence imposed for taking
indecent liberties).
34 Dominguez v. Denver, 363 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1961) (vagrancy ordinance construed so as to
require an explanation of his conduct from one who by the commission of an overt act has aroused
a reasonable suspicion of crime; defendant, at 3 a.m., was seen running away from a car, which
had a broken window, and dropping a frozen chicken en route. When asked by police why he




the underlying statute by whose authority the license was suspended
(Colorado's driver safety responsibility law) was unconstitutional.35
7. Statutory Changes. - The 1961 Colorado legislature created
two new crimes - shoplifting36 and misuse of a party-line tele-
phone.37 It extended the narcotics law to punish some new forms




1. Attempt. - A Colorado case holds that one is not guilty of
embezzlement.where, being in possession of his employer's valueless
piece of paper (a forged check) by virtue of his employment, he
fraudulently converts it to his own use believing it to be a genuine
check. 41 Although not an issue in the case 4 2 this fact situation raises
the interesting question whether it is attempted larceny, attemped
embezzlement, attempted false pretenses or attempted receiving
(insofar as these are crimes) 43 for one to steal, embezzle, obtain
by false pretenses or receive property which he believes to be
genuine and therefore valuable but which in fact is forged and
worthless. It is submitted that the answer should be yes, i.e., that
the impossibility of committing the completed crime does not nega-
tive the attempt.
44
. 2. Parties: Accomplices. - The lookout who aids the burglar
and the driver of the get-away car who assists the robber are of
course accomplices of the burglar or robber; they are working
together on the same side of the crime. A harder question is involved
when the two are working at opposite ends of the crime, e.g., bribe-
35 People v. Nothaus, 363 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 252 (1962).
36 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 106, adding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-30 et seq., defining shoplifting
as wilfully and unlawfully taking possession of merchandise displayed in a store, with intent to
feloniously convert the same without paying the purchase price. Concealment of unpurchosed
merchandise is prima facie evidence of this intent. Maximum punishment is five years in the
aenitentiary for shoplifting of merchandise worth more than $100; when the merchandise is worth
ss than $100, the maximum punishment is six months jail sentence and $300 fine for the first
offense, one year in jail and $500 fine for the second offense, and five years in the penitentiary
for the third offense. The statute also protects merchants against civil liability for slander, false
arrest, false imprisonment, or malicious prosecution by questioning persons reasonably suspected
of shoplifting.
37 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 105, provides for a punishment of 90 days in jail and $1,000
fine for wilfully refusing to yield a party line when informed of the need for an emergency call
to a fire or police department or for medical aid or ambulance service and provides for a 10 day
imprisonment and $100 fine maximum for falsely stating that an emergency exists in order to
obtain the use of a party line.
38 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 117, adding Colo. Rev. Stat. § 48-6-20(6), punishes as a mis-
demeanor (two years in jail maximum) certain unlawful conduct concerning narcotic drugs by
apothecaries, doctors, dentists and veterinarians.
39 Col Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 109, amended Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-18-1 (1953) by eliminating
the long list of types of injury and types of property covered by the crime and inserting simply
"destroy, damage or in any manner injure the real or personal property belonging to another."
The new statute also alters somewhat the penalties for malicious mischief.
40 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 107, amended Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 40-9-16, 17, 18, 21 (1953), con-
cerning the knowing importation, exhibition, sale, possession and mailing of obscene literature.
The amended statute requires that the defendant knowingly deal with obscenity, apparently to
conform to the due process requirement laid down by th United States Supreme Court in Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (ordinance punishing possession of obscene book though without
knowledge of its contents violates fourteenth amendment due process, since it inhibits free expression
because bookseller cannot safely sell books wthout first studying them).
41 Burns v. People, 360 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1961).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-5-16 (1953), defining and punishing embezzlement, does not punish
attempted embezzlement, and Colorado, unlike most (perhaps all) other states, lacks a general
attempt statute.
43 Colo. Rev. Stot. § 40-14-2 lSupp. 1960). makes attempted false pretenses a crime; but
attempted larceny and attempted receiving, as well as attempted embezzlement, seem not to be
Colorado crimes. This is a glaring loop-hole in the criminal low which should be plugged by a
general statute punishing attempts to commit crimes.
44 Thus it is attempted larceny for one, withr intent to steal, to pu
t 
his hand into an empty
pocket or cash drawer. Perkins, Criminal Law 492 (1957). It is attempted receiving stolen property
for one to receive property he believes to be stolen but which is not in fact stolen. People v. Rojas,
358 P.2d 921 (Cal. 1961).
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giver and bribe-taker, statutory rapist and underage girl, liquor-
seller and liquor-buyer, abortionist and expectant mother, receiver
and thief. Are the bribe-taker, underage girl, liquor purchaser,
expectant mother and thief accomplices in the other's criminal
venture? A 1961 Colorado case settled a conflict in the Colorado
law by following the majority rule that a thief is not an accom-
plice of the receiver (for purposes of the requirement that one
accomplice's testimony against the other should be viewed with
caution),45 the test as to an accomplice being whether he could be
charged with the same offense as the criminal himself.
46
3. Parties: Withdrawal. - A, after agreeing with B to burglarize
X's restaurant in a town some miles away, drives B there; after
investigating the restaurant, however, they decide it is too risky.
A lets B out of the car and drives off. B then, without A's knowledge,
robs Y, proprietor of another restaurant in the same town. There-
after B, hitchhiking out of town with the loot from the robbery,
is picked up by A, who by happy coincidence drives by at the right
moment. Is A guilty of robbery of Y? The Colorado court held no,
for, having voluntarily withdrawn from the original conspiracy, he
was not responsible for what his erstwhile co-conspirator thereafter
did.47 This seems a correct view of the law; A would not be guilty,
even though B had robbed X instead of Y, if A by words or conduct
notified B of his withdrawal "before the act in question has become
so imminent that its avoidance is practically out of the question. '48
4. Mental Deficiency Short of Insanity. - A defendant's mental
defect which does not amount to insanity may negative the specific
intent which a particular crime may require. 49 This proposition was
recognized in a 1961 case which, however, held that neither felony
murder (unintended killing in the commission of a felony) nor
robbery was a crime requiring a specific intent. The court was




A. Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure
The big news of 1961 in the area of criminal procedure was
the adoption, by the Colorado Supreme Court, effective November
1, 1961, of the new Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure, based
45 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961), following Newman v. People, 55 Colo. 374, 135
Pac. 460 (1913), and overruling Moynahan v. People, 63 Colo. 433, 167 Pac. 1175 (1917).
It is generally held that the underage girl and the pregnant lady are victims rather than
accomplices, and that a liquor-buyer is not an accomplice of a liquor-seller because the legislature
carefully made liquor-selling, but not liquor-buying a crime.
46 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698, 700 (Cola. 1961). This test may not be altogether workable,
for whether one can be charged with the same crime depends on whether he is an accomplice, and
whether he is an accomplice (by the test) depends on whether he can be charged with the same crime.
47 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961) (since the jury might have found, on the
evidence, the facts to be true, the court committed reversible error in not instructing the jury, on
its own motion, that this would amount to a withdrawal which would relieve A from liability for
the robbery committed by B; Doyle, J., dissented on the ground that A requested no such instruction).
48 Commonwealth v. Doris, 287 Pa. 547, 135 AtI. 313 (1926) (A and B committed a robbery,
after which A was captured while B fled; B shot a pursuing policeman to death; held, A is liable
for murder, in spite of the contention that he withdrew at the moment of capture).
49 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1 (Supp. 1960) provides that "evidence of mental condition may be
offered in a proper case as bearing on the capacity of the accused to form the specific intent
essential to constitute a crime," although no insanity plea has been made. Even without such a
statute, this ought to be the law.
50 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961), discussed supra note 25 and text. The court did
hold, however, that the mental defect was a factor for the jury to consider in fixing punishment for
first-degree murder at life or death.
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upon, but not slavishly imitating, the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Rules are commented upon at length, by members
of the committee which drafted them, in the fall, 1961, symposium
issue of the Rocky Mountain Law Review.51 Generally speaking,
the Rules do not greatly change pre-existing Colorado criminal
procedure,52 though they do make certain, without making changes,
some matters which formerly were vague.53 The principal innova-
tions made by the Rules are these: in some circumstances a
summons, instead of an arrest warrant, may be used; 54 the miscel-
laneous array of pretrial defense motions and pleas (the plea in
abatement, plea in bar, motion to quash and demurrer) are abol-
ished, and a simple motion to dismiss or grant appropriate relief
is substituted; 55 pretrial discovery and inspection by the defendant
of the prosecution's evidence is provided for to a limited degree; 56
no time limitation applies in the case of a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence;57  a new post-conviction
remedy, without limitation of time, for prisoners in custody under
criminal sentence is created for exceptional cases of unconstitutional
or otherwise seriously defective convictions; 58 the requirement of
abstracts of the record and assignments of error for appellate re-
view on writ of error is abolished; 59 a new provision on search
warrants permits a warrant to search for and seize evidentiary
material as well as the fruits of or instruments of crime, and creates
a new pretrial motion to surpress evidence obtained by an un-
reasonable search and seizure;60 assignment of counsel is mandatory
for indigents in all felony cases, unless the defendant refuses
counsel;61 and the archaic term-of-court concept of time limitations
on criminal procedural steps is abolished.6 2
A problem exists, in the relatively few areas of conflict be-
tween the pre-existing statutory procedural provision and the new
51 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. No. 1 (1961).
52 Several Colorado procedural "pets" have been retained even though they differ from the
procedure provided for in the Federal Rules,
1. The information is the normal method of accusation,
2. The names of witnesses are endorsed on the information or indictment.
3. The direct filing of the information without a preliminory examinotion is allowed.
4. The special insanity plea is required to raise that defense.
5. The defendant alone may waive jury trial.
6. The attorneys conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors.
7. Written instructions are used, and they are given before the summing up.
8. The trial court must not comment on the evidence.
9. There is no appellate review of on issue not raised by a motion for new trial or motion in
arrest of judgment.
53 E.g., the duty of one who arrests with a warrant to take the arrested person "without
unnecessary delay" before a justice of the peace; and, if without a warrant, to do so "within a
reasonable time" (Colo. R. Crim. P. 5(a) ); exactly what happens at the preliminary examination
(Cola. R. Crim. P. 5(d) ); the extent to which a defendant is entitled to examine a prosecution
witness statement to the police for use in cross-examination of the witness (Colo. R. Crim. P.
16 (b), (c), (d) ).
54 Colo. R. Crim. P. 4, 9.
55 Colo. R. Crim. P. 12.
56 Colo. R. Crim. P. 16(a), permitting defendant on court order to inspect and copy or photograph
designated books, documents or tangible objects "obtained from or belonging to the defendant or
obtained from others by seizure or by process" if items thus sought may be material to his defense.
57 Colo. R. Crim. P. 33.
58 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(b), covering an area of relief formerly dealt with by Colorado's habeas
corpus but going somewhat tyand the scope of that inadequate remedy, which has been construed
so narrowly in Colorado. Under Rule 35 (b) the defendant moves in the court which tried him to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence.
59 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39(c), providing also that the procedure concerning briefs and records in
criminal cases on error shall be the some as in civil cases.
60 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.
61 Colo. R. Crim. P. 44.
62 Colo. R. Crim. P. 45(c). This fundamental policy change necessitated changes in the time
allowed for motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment (Rules 33, 34) and the time beyond
which an accused person can no longer be prosecuted (Rule 48 (b) ), matters which formerly were
governed by the term-of.court concept of time.
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procedural rule, as to which should govern, the statute or the rule.
The 1960 enabling act,63 authorizing the Colorado Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of criminal procedure, limits the scope of the
rules to procedural (i.e., excluding substantive)64 matters, and it
contains no provision, like that found in the enabling act for the
civil rules,65 that the procedural rules shall operate to repeal con-
flicting procedural statutes. This gives rise to two questions: (1)
Do the procedural provisions in the Rules operate to repeal con-
flicting procedural statutes? (2) What matters covered by the
rules are procedural and what matters are substantive?"6
(1) I believe that the legislature's sweeping provision in the
1960 enabling act empowering the supreme court to promulgate
rules "with respect to any or all proceedings in all criminal cases"
necessarily implies, as a matter of the intent of the legislature,
that the Rules when promulgated will repeal conflicting statutes.
Furthermore, aside from the matter of legislative intent, there is
the sound principle, recognized by the Colorado Supreme Court long
ago, 67 that the courts, not the legislature, are the final authority
on what procedural rules are to be applied in the courts as part
of the tripartite division of governmental, power among the execu-
tive, judicial and legislative branches.
68
(2) I believe that nothing in the new Rules can be held to be
substantive, rather than procedural, law. 9 Just because a matter
is important does not mean that it is substantive; just because a
procedural change is big does not make it a substantive change.
Insofar as the new Colorado Rules have altered the former statu-
tory law of criminal procedure, they may have made "substantial"
procedural changes but they have not made "substantive" changes.
7t
The new Rules provide that the trial court must provide counsel
for indigent defendants in all felony cases, whereas the old statu-
tory law was that the court may do so. The new Rules provide
for dismissal of the prosecution if a year passes after the filing
of the indictment or information without bringing the defendant
to trial; the old statutory law provided for this dismissal after
two terms of court, which might be more or less than a year. These
changes are no doubt important, with important consequences, but
63 Colo. Rev. Stat. 37-2-34 (Supp. 1960).
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-2-8 (1953).
65 Not only has the legislature in the enabling act thus impliedly limited the power of the
supreme court to exclude substantive matters, but doubtless in addition the legislature could not
delegate its power to promulgate general rules of substantive law to the courts.
66 For light on the answers to these questions, I am indebted to my colleague Professor Douglas
H. Parker, of the University of Colorado School of Law, who has prepared a scholarly manuscript,
not yet published, entitled Some Illusory Pitfalls: The Repealing Effect of the Colorado Criminal
Rules, Procedurol Law versus Substantive Law, and the Ex Post Facto Limitation.
67 Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575 (1931) (" ... the power to make rules of
procedure is our [the supreme court's] constitutional right"), discussed in McCormick, Legislature
and Supreme Court Clash on Rule-Making Power in Colorado, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 664 (1933).
68 See Levin and Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making, 107 U. Pa. I. Rev. 1
(1958).
69 Parker, supra note 66, discussing the terms "substantive" and "procedural," relates these
words to criminal law as follows: "Thus, in the field of criminal law, the substantive criminal law
is concerned with the elements of the various crimes (from murder down to disturbance), as contained
in their definitions, and with the punishments which may be awarded for their violations, plus
those broader matters called "general principles" of criminal law, which, because they are applicable
to several or many or all crimes (e.g., attempt, conspiracy, self-defense, insanity) do not appear
in the definitions of the various crimes. The criminal procedural law, on the other hand, concerns
the steps taken, from arrest through trial and appellate review to post-conviction remedies, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused person."
70 Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (Fed. R. Civ. P. 35, 37, authorizing one party in civil
action to conduct a physical or mental examination of opposite party in appropriate cases, are
not invalid as substantive rules; "substantive" does not mean "important" or "substantial").
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they are nonetheless procedural changes, not substantive changes.
It has been suggested that the Colorado legislature (a) should
enact the Rules as legislative law and (b) should expressly, "by
the numbers," repeal those statutes still on the books which are
inconsistent with the Rules.' Those who believe in the supremacy
of the judiciary over the legislature in the area of court procedure
might not approve of the first suggestion on the ground that it is
unnecessary and seems to acknowledge the supremacy of the
legislature in the procedural field and might call for legislative
enactment of any subsequent amendments to the Rules. But the
second suggestion is sound, for, whether absolutely necessary or
not, it would certainly serve to eliminate confusion.
B. Declaratory Judgment
One who wishes to engage in conduct which a statute or
ordinance of questionable validity purports to punish as a crime
may prudently wish to test its validity before he undertakes to
violate its terms, rather than engage in the forbidden conduct and
later, when prosecuted, defend on the ground of the invalidity of
the law. A 1960 Colorado case allowed the use of a declaratory
judgment fur such a purpose.72 This view seems right both as a
matter of interpreting the language of the declaratory judgment
law73 (i.e., what the law is) and as a matter of what the law ought
to be. But a 1961 Colorado case, without referring to the 1960 case,
held that a declaratory judgment cannot be used for such a pur-
pose; 74 one must instead wait and raise the invalidity issue when
prosecuted for violating the statute or ordinance.
C. Information
1. Formc. - A 1961 Colorado event of some importance is the
publication of the 1961 revision of Criminal Informations and Forms
Annotated," by the late Max D. Melville, published by the Office of
the District Attorney, Denver, Colorado. The Appendix of Forms to
the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure refers to the Melville
forms for guidai.ce in charging particular crimes, from "Abortion"
to "Violations of Motor Vehicle Law." The Appendix makes one
suggested change to the Melville forms which should serve a useful
purpose: instead of unhelpfully concluding, in the traditionally
vague way, "contrary to the form of the statute in such case made
and provided, and against the peace" etc., the form concludes, "in
violation of C.R.S. 1953, §-, and against the peace" etc.
2. Allegations. - An information charging a crime committed
by two co-defendants, one of whom was in fact a principal and the
other an accessory, need not specify that a particular defendant
is principal or accessory, but can properly remain silent as to
71 A subcommittee of the Colorado Bar Association's Criminal Low Committee is charged with
preparing a list of such statutes for submission to the 1963 legislature.
72 Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery, 144 Colo. 448, 356 P.2d 884 (1960), discussed at 38 DICTA 65,
71 (1961).
73 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 77-11-2 (1953); Colo. R. Civ. P. 57 (b): "Any person . . . whose rights,
status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance . . . may have
determined any question of construction or validity arising under the . . . statute, ordinance .... .
74Meier v. Schooley, 363 P.2d 653 (Colo. 1961) (one of two grounds for denying declaratory
judgment). A concurring opinion by Sutton, J., though not citing Memorial Trusts, Inc. v. Beery,
supra note 72, would follow the statute and rule, supro note 73.
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the matter.75 An information dealing with robbery of the manager
of a supermarket may properly allege that the money was taken
from the person and against the will of the manager, though the
money actually belonged to the supermarket rather than to him.
7 6
An information charging burglary of a business building in the
language of the old burglary statute ("office, shop or warehouse")
rather than the new statute ("building") is good; the information
need not charge the crime in the exact language of the statute;
it is enough if the defendant and the jury can readily understand
the offense charged.
3. Variance. - A larceny information charged the defendant
with stealing property of the Continental Oil Co., "a corporation,"
and at the trial the prosecution proved that he stole property of
that oil company, but it failed to prove the oil company was a
corporation. The supreme court properly upheld the larceny con-
viction, holding that the defendant could not have been misled
or prejudiced by the failure of the prosecution to prove this
irrelevant fact.7 7 On the other hand, an embezzlement information
charged the defendant with embezzling a $133 check duly signed
by an officer of a named corporation, but at the trial the prose-
cution's proof showed that the check was a forgery. The supreme
court properly reversed the embezzlement conviction on the ground
of a fatal variance, since here the prosecution's own proof dis-
closed that no embezzlement was committed.78 Someone, perhaps
the defendant, committed a forgery, but as forgery was not the
crime charged, the defendant could not be convicted of that.
D. Arraignment
One defendant, charged with armed robbery, failed to plead-
at least the record contained no reference to a plea-but the case
proceeded to trial as if he had pleaded not guilty. After conviction,
the defendant noticed the lack of a plea, but the conviction was
affirmed on the basis of a sensible Colorado statute.
7 9
E. Pre-Trial Discovery
The district attorney lawfully obtained possession of the de-
fendant's books before trial. The trial court ordered that the district
75 Schreiner v. People, 360 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1961).
76 Hampton v. People, 362 P.2d 864 (Colo. 1961).
77 Straub v. People, 358 P.2d 615 (Colo. 1961).
78 Burns v. People, 360 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1961).
79 Landford v. People, 365 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1961), relying on Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37.7-9 (1953).
MARSOLEK'S HARDWARE & APPLIANCE STORE
Complete stock of Radios, Sporting Goods, Garden Supplies, Points,
Hardware, Television Sets, Hi-Fi Phonographs and Records
Radio and TV repair - 90 Day Guarantee
GARDEN TIME SPECIAL!
Plastic Garden Hose - 75 feet - $5.77
1/2 inch Rubber Garden Hose - 50 feet- $6.88
LAWN EQUIPMENT SPECIALS, TOO!
2606-16 E. Colfax FR 7-2764
Across from East High School
Open Evenings Until 8:00 P.M., Sundays 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
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attorney permit the defendant to inspect these books for the pur-
pose of preparing his defense.80 This ruling, perhaps a little bold
in view of the traditional Colorado notion that pre-trial inspection
is not allowed,8 ' would also be upheld under the new Rules.
8 2
F. Trial Through Verdict
1. Voir Dire Examination. - A prospective juror stated on
voir dire that he had formed an opinion that defendant was guilty
but that he would put aside this opinion and be guided solely by
the evidence. Defendant's challenge for cause was denied and de-
fendant did not use a peremptory challenge on him. It was held
that (a) the trial court properly denied the challenge for cause and
(b) anyway the defendant, not having exercised all his peremptory
challenges, could not complain of the erroneous denial of a chal-
lenge for cause. 83 In another criminal case in which the two sides,
each entitled to three peremptory challenges, actually without
objection exercised four, the defendant could not secure a new
trial on the ground that the prosecution used too many challenges.
8 4
In a murder case it was held not reversible error for the district
attorney to examine prospective jurors concerning their scruples
about the death penalty, though he possessed only circumstantial
evidence of the defendant's guilt, 5 since there is always the possi-
bility that direct evidence might turn up unexpectedly at the trial.8 6
2. Conduct of District Attorney. - A district attorney, trying
separately a defendant and his accomplice, is guilty of misconduct
if, at the defendant's trial to a jury, he calls the accomplice to
the witness stand without any real expectation of eliciting from
him any evidence against the defendant, knowing instead that
the accomplice will probably refuse to testify on the grounds of
self-incrimination and thus harm the defendant's case in the eyes
of the jury.87 It is doubtless misconduct too for the district attorney
to intimate, on cross-examination of the defendant in a criminal
case, that the defendant had threatened witnesses, if he possesses
no evidence of such threats.8 Although it is wrong for the district
attorney in his closing argument to misstate the facts in evidence,
an unintentional misstatement, immediately corrected, does the
defendant no harm and so cannot be reversible error.8 9
3. Fair Trial: Impartial Tribunal. - It is necessary for a fair
trial that judge and jury be impartial. In one Colorado case the
supreme court reversed a murder conviction and remanded for a
new trial before another judge because it was convinced that it
found in the record of the trial evidence of the judge's prejudice
80 Fine v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961).
81 See Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 162-63, 248 P.2d 287, 302 (1952) (trial court has no
discretionary power to permit inspection of tangible evidence, for it has no such power with respect
to documentary evidence).
82 Colo. R. Crim. P. 16 (a), discussed supra note 56.
83 Skeels v. People, 358 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1961).
84 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
85 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-2-3 (1953) provides that the death penalty may not be imposed for
first-degree murder where the evidence of guilt is circumstantial rather than direct.
86 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961).
87 De Gesualdo v. People, 364 P.2d 374 (Cola. 1961) (burglary conviction reversed for this
misconduct in view of trial court's failure, on defendant's request, to caution the jury to disregard
the incident), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 245 (1962).
88 Johnson v. People, 367 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1961) (holding, however, that the misconduct did not
constitute reversible error because the court promptly struck the question as improper).
89 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961).
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against the defendant. 90 In another case, in which the defendant's
counsel accepted as a juror a lady whom he knew to be the wife of
a merchant policeman, the defendant was not entitled to a new trial
when his counsel learned, after the defendant's conviction, that
the lady's husband was also a deputy sheriff.9 1
4. Fair Trial: Newspaper Publicity. - One of the difficulties in
giving the defendant a fair trial is created by pre-trial publicity
about the defendant and his case. Such publicity may contain
damaging information as to the defendant's former convictions for
other crimes or his confession to this crime. The matter is particu-
larly bad if the defendant's confession or prior record is inadmissible
evidence at the trial. However, when an article appeared in a
newspaper referring to the defendant as an "ex-convict," but no
juror saw it, the incident did not harm the defendant's cause.
92
5. Free Transcript. - All the states, including Colorado, are
constitutionally required to furnish a free transcript or its equiva-
lent to any indigent defendant who after conviction has something
which he is entitled to have an appellate court review. Thus a
Colorado trial court must, on an indigent defendant's request,93
or even without a request,94 supply at government expense a court
reporter for the trial in Colorado county courts as well as district
courts.
95
6. Speedy Trial. - In one 1961 case the defendant, after a
prompt trial in municipal court, appealed to the superior court
where he was entitled to a trial de novo, but fourteen months passed
(during which time he was free on bail) before he was brought
to trial. He did not, meanwhile, demand a trial. After his trial and
conviction, over his objection that he had been denied his constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial, the supreme court reversed, holding
(a) his right to a speedy trial in the superior court was not satisfied
by a speedy trial in the municipal court, and (b) his failure to
demand a trial did not constitute a waiver of his right to a speedy
trial.9 6 On the waiver point, some authorities in other jurisdictions
have taken the contrary view,97 but it would seem that the Colo-
rado rule, that it is not the defendant's duty to press for trial under
the penalty of waiving his right to speedy trial if he does not do
so, is the better one.98
Another 1961 case holds that the defendant's right to a speedy
trial is not violated when he is speedily tried and sentenced, but
sentenced erroneously to a term of imprisonment in excess of that
allowable by law, and two years later, on defendant's motion
90 Penney v. People, 360 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961). Doyle. J., dissented on the ground that the
record does not show the judge was biased, and even if he were biased his bias did not prejudice
defendant. As to the latter point, no doubt a defendant need not prove that he was actually
prejudiced if in fact the judge is shown to be biased. See Scott, State Criminal Procedure, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Prejudice, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 319 (1954).
91 Ray v. People, 364 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1961).
92 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961).
"2 Pacheco v. People, 360 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1961) (clerk's long-hand notes of objections and rulings
will not do).
9t4 Herren v. People, 363 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1961) (failure to request is not a waiver).
95 Ibid. Speeding case tried de nova on appeal to county court after trial in justice court. But
there is no need to do so in justice or municipal courts, which are not "courts of record,"
96 Hicks v. People, 364 P.2d 877 (Colo. 19611.
17 E.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 880 (1958)
(defendant's failure to demand trial is waiver of right to speedy trial).
98 Compare Herren v. People, supro note 94, (failure of defendant to request a court reporter is
not a waiver of his right to have one present).
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pointing out the error in the sentence, he is resentenced to a valid
term.99
Just as too much delay between accusation and trial may violate
the constitution, conversely too much speed may do so. In a 1961
case a motorist involved in an accident shortly after midnight was
arrested at the scene for driving under the influence and taken
before a justice of the peace; a complaint was drawn up charging
him with the crime; the justice held a trial at 2:30 a.m. at which
the defendant (after being informed of the possibility of fine and
imprisonment but not of the probability of the loss of his license)
pleaded guilty and was fined. The supreme court held that "the
summary, hasty, middle of the night justice" here dispensed was
a violation of the defendant's constitutional (due process) right
to a fair trial.100 The court held that the defendant's guilty plea
was not a waiver of his right not to be tried too speedily, for (a) he
did not know all the consequences of conviction (i.e., the probability
of license revocation) and (b) if he was in effect under the influ-
ence, as charged, he could not understandably waive his right. All
this is true, the court says, even though the justice may have acted
in a most considerate fashion by arising from his bed in the middle
of the night in order to accommodate the errant motorist by letting
him have his trial and continue on his way without a long delay.
7. Evidence. - The big event of 1961 in the area of criminal
evidence was the United States Supreme Court's holding, in Mapp
v. Ohio'01 (overruling Wolf v. Colorado10 2 ), that a state which
admits evidence obtained by unreasonable police search and seizure
violates due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This, of cotirse, will require a considerable change in pre-
existing Colorado police practices if criminals who are caught are
to be convicted. Colorado, however, need not slavishly follow
federal cases as to what searches and seizures are unreasonable.
Thus evidence seized without a search warrant as a result of a
search incident to an unlawful arrest is no doubt inadmissible, for
the search is then unreasonable; but Colorado, within certain limits
required by fairness, may have a different law of arrest from the
federal law of arrest. So, too, a federal search warrant cannot be
issued which goes beyond searching for the fruits (e.g., stolen
property) or instruments (e.g., burglar's tools, counterfeiting dies)
of crime; but the new Colorado Rules 10 3 allow a search warrant for
evidence of crime (e.g., defendant's diary or his blood-stained cloth-
ing) as well. To the extent that the Colorado law concerning arrest
and concerning search warrants differs from the federal law, the
reasonableness of the search and seizure will vary; and hence the
admissibility in Colorado courts of evidence searched for and seized
by Colorado police may, in a particular fact situation, differ from
the admissibility in federal courts of evidence obtained by federal
police in exactly the same fashion.
99 Casias v. People, 367 P.2d 327 (Colo. 1961).
100 Toland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
101 367 U.S. 643 (1961), discussed, with reference to Colorado in particular, in Weinstein, Local
Responsibility for Improvement of Search and Seizure Practices, 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 150 (1962).
102 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
103 Colo. R. Crim. P. 41 (b)(3).
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A number of Colorado criminal cases decided in 1961 necessarily
involved evidentiary problems. The admissibility of photographs
vividly portraying the shocking details of the crime 0 4 and the ad-
missibility in a variety of situations of evidence of defendant's
former convictions'0 5 were, as usual, favorite topics. A number of
cases dealt with the application of the rule permitting the jury
to draw an inference that the defendant stole or got property
through burglary or robbery, from the defendant's recent, ex-
clusive, unexplained possession of property taken by larceny,
burglary or robbery. 106 Two cases concerned the testimony of
prosecution witnesses whose names were not endorsed on the in-
formation. 0 7 Although a coerced confession is of course inadmissi-
ble, a confession is admissible without a hearing as to its volun-
tariness unless defendant first suggests that it is involuntary. 08
A psychiatrist was allowed to testify as an expert on insanity
though he had once said in a speech that a plumber is just as good
as a psychiatrist at determining the capacity of an accused to
recognize right and wrong!10 9 Evidence of defendant's flight after
waiting several days following the crime,110 as well as evidence
that defendant fabricated favorable evidence or tried to suppress
unfavorable evidence,"' is admissible as showing consciousness
of guilt. In Colorado there is no absolute rule that an accomplice's
testimony must be corroborated if the prosecution is to avoid a
directed verdict."
12
8. Burden of Proof: Presumption v. Inference. - A criminal de-
fendant may use certain defenses negativing guilt, sometimes loosely
termed "affirmative defenses," all of which, except for insanity,
may be shown under a plea of not guilty - such as the general
defenses of alibi, self-defense, mistake of fact or law, compulsion,
insanity, intoxication, infancy, and the special defenses created by
a specific proviso or exception applicable to a particular crime
(e.g., death after a year and a day, for murder or manslaughter;
termination of pregnancy on doctor's advice to save life, for abor-
tion). With all these defenses it is clear that the defendant has
the burden of going forward with some evidence showing that
such a defense may exist, for there is, as it were, a sort of presump-
tion, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the defense does not
exist. But the defendant's burden of persuasion is one only of raising
104 Skeels v. People, 358 P.2d 605 (Colo. 1961); Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961); Mills
v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961); Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961); Wooley v.
People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1961).
105 Gallegos v. People, 362 P.2d 178 (Colo. 1961); Stanmore v. People, 362 P.2d 1042 (Colo. 1961)
(better to refer to former crimes as "former transactions"); Hampton v. People, 362 P.2d 864 (Colo.
1961); Garrison v. People, 364 P.2d 197 (Colo. 1961); Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo.
1961); Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961); Wooley v. People, 367 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1961).
106 Pena v. People, 363 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1961) (under the rule conviction of burglary sustained);
Ciccorelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961) (recognizing that the rule is one involving an inference,
not a presumption in a mandatory sense, i.e., the jury may infer guilt but it need not do so); Crux
v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961) (rule applies to robbery as well as to larceny and burglary);
Stevenson v. People, 367 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1961) (rule inoperative where no proof that defendant
was lessee, co-lessee, occupant or resident of premises where burglary loot found).
107 Fine v. People, 360 P.2d 682 (Colo. 1961) (allowing such a witness to testify is not reversible
error when defendant failed to object); Landtord v. People, 365 P.2d 893 (Colo. 1961) (defendant
not prejudiced even though witness was not endorsed until day of trial).
108 Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
109 Hammil v. People, 361 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1961).
110 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 241 (1962).
111 Johnson v. People, 367 P.2d 896 (Colo. 1961).
112 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961).
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a reasonable doubt in the minds of the fact-finder (generally, the
jury) .113
One 1961 case' 1 4  involved the rule that the fact-finder may
(though it need not) infer defendant's guilt of larceny of property
from his recent, exclusive, unexplained possession of stolen property.
The trial court's instruction was that recent, exclusive, unex-
plained possession of stolen property raises a "presumption" that
the possessor stole it; that the burden of explaining recent, ex-
clusive possession was on the defendant; and that his explanation
must be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in the
jury's minds. The instruction did not specifically state that the
jury must (as distinguished from may) find the defendant guilty
on proof of recent, exclusive possession if the defendant does not
explain it away to the extent of raising a reasonable doubt; but
the word "presumption" is so ambiguous as to be susceptible of
that meaning. 115 The supreme court held that the instruction, though
not a model one, was not so bad as to constitute reversible error.
It is submitted that an instruction which states an inference in the
language of a presumption without further explanation is so dan-
gerously misleading that it ought to be held to constitute reversible
error.
116
9. Directed Verdict. - In order for the prosecution to avoid a
directed verdict, it must put on a prima facie case,1 17 but need
not put on all the evidence it has.""
10. Instructions. - In a 1960 criminal case the Colorado Su-
preme Court advised Colorado trial courts to couch their instruc-
tions in the language of the applicable criminal statute.119 In a
1961 case, however, the supreme court reversed a trial court which
too literally followed this advice.12 ° The trouble is that the statute
sometimes contains too much law, sometimes too little law, and
113 2 King, Colorado Practice Methods § 2377 (1956, Supp. 1961).
114 Ciccarelli v. People, 364 P.2d 368 (Colo. 1961).
115 See McCormick, Evidence § 308 (1954), on "Presumptions, Permissive and Mandatory."
116 So held in Barfield v. United States, 229 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir. 1956) (the court said, con-
cerning the inference of guilt of larceny from recent, exclusive, unexplained possession: "We think
too, that the use of the words 'presumption' and 'presume' in the instruction was misleading. What
the court was dealing with was an inference rather than a presumption."); United States v. Sherman,
171 F.2d 619, 624 (2d Cir. 1948), per L. Hand, J. (same; "the jury may be misled by the word
'presumption' ").
117 In two 1961 Colorado cases the supreme court reversed convictions for failure to make out
a prima facie case: Gonzales v. People, 361 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1961) (prosecution's proof: defendant
borrowed uncle's car; five hours later uncle's car, occupied by persons unknown, was seen pushing
a stolen car; held, in prosecution for larceny of car, verdict should have been directed for defendant);
Butmeister v. People, 361 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1961) (in prosecution for false pretenses, prosecution's
proof was that defendant was paid as if he had used own car for official trips, when in fact he
used government car; held, verdict should have been directed for defendant because of lack of
evidence that defendant ever represented that he used own car).
118 Tafoya v. People, 366 P.2d 860 (Colo. 1961).
119 Vigil v. People, 143 Cola. 328, 334, 353 P.2d 82, 85-86 (1960), discussed at 38 DICTA 65,
75-76 (1961), not altogether with approval, for the particular statutes which the supreme court
advised the trial court to cite in a case involving the defense of self-defense included a lot of
matter which had nothing to do with self-defense.
120 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961). A single Colorado statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
40-1-12 (1953) defines and punishes as a principal an accessory before the fact (one, not present,
wha has advised or encouraged the perpetration of a crime) and defines (though it is the following
sectian which punishes, less severely than a principal is punished) an accessory during the fact
(one who, finding himself present when a crime is being committed, does not do what he can to
prevent it). In the Johnson case the undisputed evidence showed the defendant, who had driven
two robbers to the scene, left before they committed the robbery. The trial court, reading from the
statute, unfortunately included the inapplicable part concerning an accessory during the fact, and
then, because it did not also give the following section of the statute punishing less severely the
crime of being an accessory during the fact, may have left the impression that an accessory during




sometimes ambiguous formulations of the law, so that to follow
the statute too closely may confuse or mislead the jury.
One case held that the trial court erred in failing, on its own
motion, to give an instruction dealing with the defendant's theory
of his defense after it properly failed to give the defendant's
tendered instruction, which erroneously stated the law concerning
his theory of defense. 21 A number of other cases dealt with the
prejudicial effect of erroneous instructions. Thus it was held not
to be reversible error, in a murder case, to instruct on involuntary
manslaughter (as to which there was no evidence), where the
jury convicted of murder,' 22 in spite of the rule expressed in an-
other case that "generally it is improper to instruct on a degree of
homicide not sustained by the evidence.' 1 3 Erroneous instructions
favorable to the defendant do not, of course, constitute reversible
error.1 24 In a case wherein the defendant, after pleading insanity,
virtually abandoned this defense there is no need for instructions
on insanity especially if the defendant did not request any instruc-
tion thereon. 125 The court need not instruct specifically on such
"defenses" to a homicide charge as that the victim committed
suicide or accidentally shot himself where the given instructions
adequately set forth the elements of murder, the law on burden
of proof, and the need to acquit if the crime is not proved. 126
The trial court should not communicate instructions to the
jury outside the courtroom and without the presence of counsel
when the jury, having retired to consider its verdict, desires further
instructions; but this conduct, although improper, does not con-
stitute reversible error where no harm is done.127
11. Verdict. - A jury which was given the standard "third
degree" instruction 28  after becoming "hopelessly dead-locked"
twenty-five hours after submission to it of a murder case, was
held not to have been coerced into a verdict. 29
121 Ibid. (Doyle, J., dissenting).
122 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961), Had the jury found the defendant guilty of
involuntary manslaughter, however, the instruction would have been reversible error becbuse the
jury might have acquitted him if the opportunity for a compromise verdict had not been presented.
Dickens v. People, 67 Colo. 409, 186 Pac. 277 (1919).
123 See Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961), noted at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 241 (1962).
124 Jones v. People, 360 P.2d 686 (Colo. 1961).
125 Cruz v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961).
126 Atencio v. People, 364 P.2d 575 (Colo. 1961).
127 Ray v. People, 364 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1961) (jury, deliberating fate of two co-defendants, sent
message to judge at home via the bailiff asking whether it could convict one defendant and acquit
the other; the judge told the bailiff to write "yes" on a slip of paper and deliver it to the jury).
128 "You should consider that this case must at sometime be decided; that you have been selected
in the same manner and from the same source as any future jury must be; that there is no reason to
suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve men more intelligent, more impartial or
more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will be produced on the one side or
the other; that in order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous conclusion you must examine the
questions submitted to you with candor and n proper regard and deference to the opinions of each
other; that you ought to pay proper respect to each other's opinions and listen with a disposition
to be convinced to each other's arguments.
"If a majority of your number are for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether a
doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one which makes no impression upon the minds of so many
men equally honest and intelligent with himself, who under the sanction of the same oath have
heard the same evidence, with the same attention and an equal desire to arrive at the truth.
"On the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal, the minority ought seriously to ask them.
selves whether they may not reasonably, and ought not to, doubt the correctness of a judgment
from which so many of their number dissent, and distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence
which fails to carry conviction to the minds of their fellows.
"And, while at the last each juror must act upon his own judgment concerning the evidence
in the case and not upon the judgment of his fellows, it is your duty, guided by the foregoing and
by all of the instructions heretofore given in this case, to decide the case, if you can conscientiously
do so.
"It is accordingly ordered by the court that you be returned to your jury room for further
deliberation."
129 Mills v. People, 362 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1961).
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G. Sentence
One convicted of any one of several named sex crimes may
be sentenced (for one day to life) to the penitentiary, under the
Colorado statute.130 The trial court, in deciding whether to sentence
the sex offender under the regular law or to do so under the sex
offender law (i.e., in deciding whether he is a threat to the public
or is an habitual offender and mentally ill) need not follow the
advice contained in the psychiatric report which the court re-
quested before imposing sentence.
13 '
In sentencing habitual criminals, trial courts sometimes make
mistakes. It is, of course, improper to sentence the two time habitual
offender to two consecutive terms of imprisonment, one for the
substantive crime and one for the former crime.1 32 A felony con-
viction in another state counts for habitual criminal purposes, even
though the conduct for which convicted there does not constitute
a felony under Colorado law. 33 Trial courts sometimes make other
sorts of mistakes in sentencing. Where the court orally stated, in
sentencing the defendant, that the sentence was to be served con-
currently with another sentence he had earlier received, but the
mittimus stated the sentence was to be served consecutively, the
supreme court ordered the mittimus corrected to conform to the
sentence as actually imposed.1 34 The trial court has power to correct
an illegal sentence, on defendant's motion, even after the expiration
of the term of court. 35 But it may not increase a sentence once the
defendant has begun to serve it.' 36
130 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961) (the statute, however, empowers the parole
board to transfer the sex offender from the penitentiary to the state hospital or other institution).
131 Ibid. (psychiatric report stated defendant was not mentally deficient, and contained no state-
ment that he was a threat to the public.)
132 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
133 Burns v. People, 365 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1961) (carrying concealed weapons is a Nebraska felony,
as proved by a certified copy of the Nebraska statute defining and punishing that crime).
134 Duran v. People, 360 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1961).
135 Casias v. People, 367 P.2d 327 (Colo. 1961) (defendant illegally received 25-30 year sentence
in 1959 for burglary as a third felony offender, when in fact he was only a second offender;
defendant p roperly resentenced in 1961 to 10-15 years as a second offender; Villalon v. People,
358 P.2d 18 (Cola. 1961). Colo. R. Crim. P. 35 (a) provides that an illegal sentence (e.g., punish-
ment for a crime awarded in excess of that allowed by law for that crime; multiple and consecutive
punishment for what is in effect one offense) may be corrected at any time. A sentence is not
illegal, however, because it comes at the end of a trial during which errors occurred. Hill v. United
States, 82 Sup. Ct. 468 (U.S. 1962).
136 Righi v. People, 359 P.2d 656 (Colo. 1961).
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A justice of the peace may sentence a youth between sixteen
and twenty-one, convicted of a misdemeanor, to the reformatory
even though the reformatory is in another county.
137
H. Review on Writ of Error
As noted above, abstracts of record and assignments of error
in criminal cases have been abolished by the new Rules and the
procedure which governs the form and filing of records and briefs
on writ of error in civil cases applies in criminal cases. 1 3  But, for
the time being at least, the present cumbersome procedure for
obtaining a writ of error in a criminal case - "lodging" the record
in the supreme court within six months from the judgment of
conviction - rather than the simple act of filing a praecipe in the
supreme court as in a civil case, is still required. 3 9
Also as previously noted, the present procedural rule requiring
the defendant to raise an alleged trial court error by a motion for
new trial or a motion in arrest of judgment before the supreme court
will review the error 140 is continued under the new Rules. 4 1
In a case in which the convicted defendant showed that the
justice court in convicting him (at too hasty a trial) "exceeded
its jurisdiction,'1 42 the supreme court upheld the district court's
granting him the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, vacating the
judgment of conviction and ordering a new trial, because it was
doubtful whether the defendant (having pleaded guilty) could have
appealed his conviction in the regular way.
143
Another case concerned th6 conclusiveness, upon supreme court
review on writ of error, of recitals in the record. 144 Perhaps the
record showed the defendant was arraigned and pleaded, but on
error he.denied that these events ever took place. The supreme
court held that, at least where the defendant is represented at his
trial by competent counsel, recitals in the record are conclusive
on writ of error, for the defendant must seasonably call the trial
court's attention to the defect for correction at the time.145
The scope of supreme court review of trial court action in
punishing a direct criminal contempt (misbehavior in the court's
presence) is limited.1 46 So too is judicial review on certiorari of
the parole board's discretionary action in revoking parole. 147
137 Aranda v. People, 361 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1961).
138 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39 (a).
139 Colo. R. Crim. P. 39 (a), discussed at 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 83-84 (1961).
140 Cruz v. People, 364 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1961); Dyer v. People, 364 P.2d 1062 (Colo. 1961) (unless
justice requires review).
141 Colo. R. Crim. P. 37(b) ("except that plain error or defects affecting substantive rights may
be noted although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court").
142 Colo. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(4) permits district courts to grant certiorari relief where an inferior
tribunal has "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion, and there is no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy." On certiorari, review is limited to a determination of whether the tribunal
exceeded its jurisdiction. "Jurisdiction" is here not used in its usual sense of power to hear and
decide, for a justice court has power to hear and decide misdemeanor cases. A court apparently
"exceeds its jurisdiction" when it tries a defendant in a manner which violates constitutional rights.
143 Tolland v. Strohl, 364 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1961).
144 Apparently meaning the clerk's record containing minutes of the proceedings, rather than the
transcript prepared by the court reporter.
145 Madrid v. People, 365 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1961).
146 Wall v. District Court, 360 P.2d 452 (Colo. 1961).
147 Berry v. People, 367 P.2d 338 (Colo. 1961). It would seem, however, that there can be court
review of the procedure involved in parole revocation. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-17-6 (1953), as amended
by Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104, requires at least a parole board investigation before revocation.
No statute requires a hearing, however. Cf., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-16-9, requiring a court hearing
before revocations of probation, as distinguished from parole.
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The facts of one 1961 case raise an interesting double-jeopardy
problem, although it is not discussed by the court. A defendant,
charged with robbery and murder, was convicted of robbery but
acquitted of murder, and on writ of error he obtained a reversal
of his robbery conviction, the supreme court remanding the case
for a new trial.148 On the new trial can the defendant be tried for
murder as well as robbery, or does his acquittal on the murder




Since Rule 35 (b) of the new Rules of Criminal Procedure pro-
vides a new post-conviction remedy (a motion in the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence)
for prisoners in custody, under certain limited circumstances (which
are, however, broader circumstances than the ones which Colorado
recognizes for habeas corpus purposes),15° the remedy of habeas
corpus for prisoners in custody will henceforth have less significance
than heretofore. 15' Up until November of 1961, however, habeas
corpus was still in vogue. But habeas corpus cannot help a prisoner
who complains that the parole board is not giving his case proper
consideration;1 152 and it will not help one who fails to attach, as
required by law, the warrant of commitment to his petition. 53 A
petition for habeas corpus which alleges a commutation of sentence
by the governor entitling the prisoner to release from imprison-
ment states a good claim for habeas corpus relief, and, if the state
wishes to contest his release on the ground that the governor re-
voked the commutation, it must do so by evidence at the hearing
held to determine whether to release the prisoner.154 It would seem,
however, that the matter of revocation of the commutation could be
determined on the basis of the files and records of the case so that
there need not be a hearing to decide the matter.
155
J. Confession of Error
In at least two 1961 cases the attorney general, in appearing
before the supreme court on writ of error obtained by a convicted
defendant, confessed error, in the tradition of the office of the
Solicitor General of the United States before the United States
Supreme Court. 5 6
K. Statutory Changes
The 1961 Colorado legislature made several changes in existing
criminal procedure. Upon an insanity plea being made, the court
148 Johnson v. People, 358 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1961).
149 The matter is discussed briefly in King, Colorado Pro",;cn Methods § 2389 n. 94 (Supp. 1961).
150 Sen comment on Rule 35 in 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 63-78 (1961).
151 See id. at 66-67, for the proposition that a prisoner in custody cannot seek habeas corpus
relief without first making a motion under Rule 35(b).
152 Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961).
153 Wright v. Tinsley, 365 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1961). A less technical reason, not used by the court,
for upholding the lower court's denial of habeas corpus sought on the ground that at his triol he
wos deprived of a jury trial, is that he actually obtained a review of his conviction on writ of
error without mentioning this ground, and his conviction was affirmed. If the matter is reviewable
on error, as here, it must be so reviewed, for habeas corpus is no substitute for a writ of error.
154 Sharp v. Tinsley, 362 P.2d 859 (Colo. 1961).
155 Rule 35 (b), on the post-conviction motion to vacate sentence, provides that if "the files and
record of the case show to the satisfaction of the court that the prisoner is entitled to no relief,"
then no hearing is necessary.
156 Penny v. People, 360 P.2d 671 (Colo. 1961) (confessing that the trial court erred in not
directing a verdict of acquittal); Pacheco v. People, 360 P.2d 974 (Colo. 1961) (confessing that the
trial court erred in not having a court reporter present to transcribe the proceedings).
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may order the defendant examined by psychiatrists at the jail in
which he is confined, rather than having him sent (as has had to
be done heretofore) either to the State Hospital at Pueblo or the
Colorado Psychopathic Hospital at Denver for his examination.
15
Cash security for a bail bond is authorized in addition to the secu-
rity of sureties on the bail bond.158 A criminal complaint made for
the purpose of the issuance of an arrest warrant may be made be-
fore not only a judge or justice, as in the past, but also before his
clerk or deputy clerk.159 An amended statute provides for dismissal
of a criminal case unless tried within two terms of court after com-
mitment of the defendant; 160 but the effect of this statute is uncer-
tain, for the new Rules, after sensibly doing away with the term-of-
court concept of time, made the period of time one year.'6 County
and municipal police officers are now specifically authorized to
cross county and municipal boundaries in fresh pursuit of a traffic
violator.162 A final 1961 statute changes the composition of the
parole board and it makes some small alterations in the procedure
to be used by parole officials in revocation of parole. 163
157 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 102, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-2 (1953). The change was
made to reduce the defendant's use of the plea as a method of improving his chances to escape.
158 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 100, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-2-17 (1953). Colo. R. Crim.
P. 46(c) (1961) authorizes cash bail as well as a bond with surety or a personal recognizance bond.
159 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 99, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-2.3, 7 (1953). See Colo. R.
Crim. P. 3 for issuance of a complaint.
160 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 101, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-7-12 (1953).
161 Colo. R. Crim. P. 48(b). The effect of a conflict between statute and rule is discussed supra
notes 63-70 and text.
162 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 103.
163 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 104, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-17-3, 6 (1953).
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